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Abstract: The debate on the impact of audit quality on firm value and how corporate government 
moderate this relationship has surfaced as a result of numerous corporate scandals. As a result, the study 
examined the impact of audit quality on firm value and how corporate governance moderate this 
relationship. The study used the annual reports of 36 Ghanaian banks from 2010 to 2017. A random 
effect regression model was used to estimate the relationships. The results revealed that audit quality 
have a positive impact on the value of a firm. Thus, the engagement of the services of the Big 4 audit 
firms contribute to the increment of the value of the firms. In addition, the existence of effective 
corporate governance improves the relationship between the audit quality and the value of the firms. 
Corporate governance therefore facilitates improved moderation of the relationship between audit 
quality and the value of firms.  
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1. Introduction  
The banking sector has contributed significantly towards the economy in a number 
of developing countries. For example, the Ghana Statistical Service (2017) reported 
that in the year 2017, the banking sector contributed approximately 9. 4% to the 
Ghanaian gross domestic product (GDP). However, since the year 2013, there have 
been sustained challenges in the banking sector in Ghana. The collapse of DKM, a 
microfinance institution in Ghana during the year 2015 resulted in the loss of 
millions of dollars of depositor’s monies. The Bank of Ghana (BoG) and other 
stakeholders had hardly come in terms with the collapse of the institutions when two 
other commercial banks, UT Bank and Capital Bank had their licenses revoked by 
the Bank of Ghana in the year 2017. At the insistence of the regulator, these banks 
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were acquired by another bank, ‘gcb Bank’. Five additional commercial banks 
collapsed eight months later in the year 2018. The Government of Ghana established 
another bank to assume all the liabilities and assets of these five banks. The 
Government of Ghana (GoG) reported that these activities cost the state 
approximately 2. 2 billion dollars (Ministry of Finance, 2018).  
Since the banking sector occupies a key role in stimulating the economic and 
entrepreneurial development of a nation, the collapse of these banks affected the 
Ghanaian economy. Consequently, the Government of Ghana and other stakeholders 
undertook to ascertain the causes of these banking failures. As a result, an auditing 
firm, KPMG was tasked to investigate what might have accounted for the collapse 
of the banks. The KPMG Report (2018) documented several factors including related 
party transactions, managerial incompetence, disregard to banking laws and 
reporting irregularities as the major causes of the collapse of the banks. All these 
points to weak or lack of good corporate governance practices in these banks. These 
findings opened a debate on the role of auditors in all these corporate failures. The 
debate was motivated by previous corporate failures such as Enron and WorldCom. 
The collapse of these multinational corporations was attributed to reporting and 
auditing scandals that eventually brought governance and audit quality into the 
spotlight (Salehi, Moradi and Paiydarmanesh, 2017).  
Since external auditors and good corporate governance ensure financial reporting 
quality, reduction in agency cost that arise from the opportunistic behaviour of 
managers and reduction in information asymmetry, the question was posed of 
whether external auditing would be necessary if it failed to detect these corporate 
scandals. The concern is justified because users of financial statements resort to the 
audit reports when they are doubtful about the reliability of the financial statements 
produced by a firm (Aobdia, 2019). Despite the foregoing, previous studies have 
provided evidence on the impact of audit quality on the performance of firms, 
however, the results were inconclusive and conflicting. There are studies that 
reported that the quality of external auditing contributes significantly to the 
performance of firms (Zureigat, 2010; Chen, Chen, Lobo & Wang, 2011; Hassan & 
Farouk, 2014; Matoke & Omwenga, 2016; and Smii, 2016). These authors explain 
that quality auditing provides assurance to the various stakeholders as well as offer 
valuable advice to businesses which eventually results in improved performance. 
Conflicting these results, Sulong, Gardner, Hussin and Sanusi (2013); Rahimi and 
Amini (2015); and Elewa and El-Haddad (2019) provided evidence that audit quality 
had no or negative impact on the performance of firms. According to these authors, 
audit quality instead drains the resources of firms, especially when firms engage the 
services of prominent auditing firms which requires the payment of high auditing 
fees.  
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Whilst the debate on the impact of audit quality on firm performance is yet to be 
concluded, there are others that have found that the study of the relationship between 
audit quality and firm performance without examining the moderating role of 
corporate governance in their relationship is subject to spurious conclusions. This is 
because corporate governance is noted to have significantly created changes in 
contemporary business environments, particularly in the accounting and auditing 
professions (Inaam & Khamoussi, 2016 and Agyei-Mensah, 2019). According to 
Agyei-Mensah (2019), corporate governance particularly affects audit quality and 
firm performance due to its strategic role in the modern business environment. 
Researchers such as () agree that corporate governance, especially the audit 
committee structure, affect audit quality and firm performance because it facilitates 
the monitoring and controlling the activities of the management of a firm, in the 
absence of the owners. An Audit committee is a significant governance mechanism 
because it helps to improve the quality of auditing function, financial management 
and firm performance. External auditors maintain a close working relationship with 
audit committees, which are regarded as fundamental to sound corporate governance 
(Inaam & Khamoussi, 2016). Similarly, Chen, Chen, Lobo and Wang (2011) explain 
that to enhance public confidence and mitigate corporate financial failures, efficient 
and effective functioning of audit committees is essential.  
Though, there are some studies on the impact of corporate governance on firm 
performance, the role of corporate governance in improving the relationship between 
audit quality and the performance of firms requires further investigation, particularly 
against the background of numerous questions raised on the effectiveness of auditing 
and corporate governance in the Ghanaian banking sector. More recently, a number 
of studies have provided evidence that mere quality of auditing might not necessarily 
affect the performance of companies with weaker corporate governance practice 
(Hassan & Farouk, 2014; Matoke & Omwenga, 2016). The argument advanced by 
these researchers is that audit quality can have limited impact on the performance of 
firms if these are accompanied by inefficient enforcement mechanisms and weak 
corporate governance. In this context, there is dearth of knowledge on the 
moderating role of corporate governance on the relationship between audit quality 
and value of firms in developing countries, where little previous studies were 
conducted. This substantiates the necessity for the study into the moderating effects 
of corporate governance on audit quality and firm value. As a result, the study aimed 
to provide case study evidence on the impact of audit quality on a firm’s value and 
how corporate governance moderates this relationship. The real contribution of this 
study to the existing body of knowledge in this field is to provide further evidence 
of the relationship between audit quality and firm value in a developing country.  
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2. Literature Review  
2.1. Auditing and Audit Quality  
The separation of ownership and control and information asymmetry between 
management and owners of a firm has resulted in an agency problem. This has 
created the need for external auditing. Unlike similar concepts, the definition of 
auditing is subject to less conflicts and disagreement. Auditing is the independent 
and systematic evaluation of the records and books of a firm or an organisation to 
verify or ascertain the authenticity of the facts presented in the financial statements 
regarding the operations of a firm (Hassan & Farouk, 2014). According to the 
International Standards on Auditing 200, the overall objective of external auditing is 
to increase the degree of confidence of targeted users in the financial statements. 
This objective is achieved through the expression of opinion by the auditor on 
whether the prepared financial statements presents fairly, in all material respects and 
in accordance with the applicable financial statements of a firm’s financial 
performance. This presupposes that auditors have a fiduciary responsibility to 
provide quality audit reports.  
The external auditing ensures that the financial statements presented by management 
are truthfully stated and are presented in accordance with the necessary reporting and 
legal frameworks. The independent verification and opinion provided by auditors 
provides credibility of the financial statements (Cahan & Sun, 2015). In addition, as 
per the auditing standards, external auditors are required to communicate and discuss 
the quality of the audit with the audit committee of an entity. This emphasise the 
significance of an audit quality. As explained by Zhang (2107), the quality of an 
audit is anticipated to restrain and constrain opportunistic behaviour of management, 
in addition to the reduction of the risk that the financial statements contain omissions 
and material misstatements.  
Usually, audit quality would mean the extent to which auditors adhered to the 
auditing standards and professionalism in the discharge of their duties. This suggests 
that the auditors must execute their duties with due regard to professional care, 
competence, and independence. However, these attributes of audit quality are not 
easily measured. As a result, researchers have used other variables as proxies for 
audit quality.  
The most popular proxies of audit quality are audit fees and firms audited by the Big 
4 auditing firms such as KPMG, Price Waterhhuse Coopers, Ernst and Young, 
Deloitte (Bédard et al. , 2010). The justification for the use of audit fees is that quality 
audit is expensive and firms that can afford to pay receives it. It is perceived that the 
higher the audit fee, the higher the audit quality. In the auditing profession, Deloitte, 
Price Waterhouse Coopers (PwC), KPMG and Ernst and Young (EY) are the big 
four auditing firms in the world. Together, these firms hold more than 50% of the 
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auditing market in the world (Asthana, Khurana and Raman, 2019). These auditing 
firms have the required resources, both human and logistical to enable them to render 
quality audits (Asthana, Khurana & Raman, 2019). Firms that are audited by the Big 
4 auditing are perceived to receive quality audit than their counterparts. Here, the 
difference between the two variables is blurred because the Big 4 auditing firms are 
those that charge higher fees. It can be observed from the foregone discussion that 
the quality of auditing is multi-dimensional, and the perceived differences lead to the 
variations in their effects on a firms’ performance.  
2.2. Ghanaian Banking Institutions and Corporate Governance Structures 
Corporate governance in the banking industry has gained attention in literature due 
to the significant role occupied by banks. Corporate governance entails procedures, 
mechanisms, policies, practices, rules and processes by which firms or organisations 
are managed and controlled (Yermack, 2017). The main aim of effective corporate 
governance is to protect the interests of shareholders. This is because, without 
corporate governance, management would act in their own interest, instead of the 
interest of the owners of a firm (Mccahery, Sautner and Starks, 2016). The 
compliance of a firm with good corporate governance ensures the value of 
shareholders through the appropriate utilisation of the resources of a firm to 
maximise the value of a firm (Oppong et al. , 2016). According to McCahery et al. 
(2016), the key feature of corporate governance is its distribution role of the rights 
and responsibilities among the various stakeholders of an entity.  
In the banking sector in Ghana, policy makers and other stakeholders have put in 
place measures, legislations and policies to ensure good corporate governance 
practices among banks. The corporate governance code in Ghana is influenced by 
numerous factors. Several monitoring mechanisms exist to ensure that banks adhere 
to good corporate governance practices. These monitoring mechanisms mostly 
involve the promulgation of laws that compel the banks to operate within a 
legislative framework. These laws include the Ghana Nanking Act (Act 408), the 
Ghana Banking Act 1986 (PNDCL 225), the Criminal Code, The Ghana Companies 
Act 1963 (Act 179), and the Bank of Ghana regulations. Responding to the collapse 
of the seven banks, the Bank of Ghana introduced specific corporate governance 
mechanisms for banks. Among these include a four-year fixed-term tenure for 
managing directors and CEOs of banks in Ghana as well as specific qualifications 
and experience for the principal officers of banks.  
In addition, as Ghana is a former colony of Britain, the majority of corporate 
governance processes are borrowed from that country. In addition, as a member of 
several international unions and associations, this impacted on the corporate 
governance structures in corporate Ghana (Oppong et al. , 2016). For example, firms 
in Ghana are guided by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Similarly, the banks in 
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Ghana are also guided by the Basel III, developed by the Bank for International 
Settlements.  
2.3. Theoretical Framework  
This study was conducted within the framework of agency theory. In a contemporary 
business environment, the management of ownership of businesses are different. The 
management are hired by the owners to manage their business in return of rewards 
for their service. This means that the main aim of management is the maximisation 
of the wealth of the shareholders. However, there is the tendency that management 
would pursue their personal interests at the expense of the investors. This is made 
possible because of information asymmetry where the quality and quantity of 
information available to management is disproportionately more than the 
information available the investors (Lin & Hwang, 2010). This conundrum is the 
agency theory and the associated problem is known as an agency problem. Agency 
theory highlights the existence of agency problems between management and 
investors as a result of segregation of ownership and control which may result in 
entrenchment and expropriation of the wealth of investors by management (Sultana, 
Singh & Rahman, 2019).  
The agency theory postulates that the monitoring roles occupied by external auditors, 
align the interests of both the owners and managers and eliminate conflicts of 
interest, which is inherent in corporate management. The separation of ownership 
from management highlights the necessity for a quality audit (Lin & Hwang, 2010). 
External auditors occupy monitoring roles that ensure that financial statements 
provided by management are reliable and free from material misstatements. Another 
mechanism that cures the agency problem is the formation of audit committee made 
up mostly of non-executive directors. The audit committee is a sub-committee of the 
board of directors that occupy corresponding roles between external auditors, 
management and the board of a firm. The independent audit committee serves as a 
trustee in the system of governance that helps to eliminate or, at least, decreases 
information asymmetry, mitigating agency issues. This implies that the independent 
audit committee contributes towards quality auditing. Similarly, Sultana, Singh and 
Rahman (2019) assert that to mitigate the risk of corporate financial failures and 
enhance the confidence of the public, effective functioning of an independent audit 
committee is needed. Correspondingly, audit committees are assigned the 
responsibility of ensuring effective internal control, which is necessary for the 
smooth running of a firm. In a summary, audit committee improves the audit quality 
and the overall performance of a firm.  
2.4. Empirical Review  
There are a number of studies that directly examine the impact of audit quality on 
the performance of firms. The results have provided conflicting outcomes. For 
example, Chen, Chen, Lobo and Wang (2011) investigated the impact of audit 
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quality on cost of capital and earnings management. Chen et al. (2011) found that 
audit quality had a positive impact on the cost of capital of non-state-own enterprises 
whilst no relationship was found between audit quality and cost of capital of state-
owned enterprises. In Nigeria, Hassan and Farouk (2014) investigated the 
relationship between audit quality, measured by auditor size and financial 
performance of quoted cement firms. The authors found a positive and significant 
relationship between audit quality and the financial performance of the firms. 
Similarly, Ugwunta, Ugwunyani and Ngwa (2018) examined the effect of audit 
quality on the market price of companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The 
audit quality was measured by using the Big 4 benchmark. Ugwunta, Ugwunyani 
and Ngwa (2018) found that audit quality was positive and significantly related to 
financial performance.  
In another study in Kenya, Matoke and Omwenga (2016) examined the relationship 
between audit quality and performance of firms listed on the Nairobi Stock 
Exchange. The authors found that the effect of audit quality on financial performance 
of firms was positive and significant. Nazir and Afza (2013) also investigated the 
impact of audit quality on the value of firms in Pakistan. The audit quality was 
proxied by an audit committee whilst return on assets and Tobin’s Q were used to 
measure firms’ value. The study found that audit quality had a positive and strong 
impact on both ROA and Tobin’s Q. In Jordan, Zureigat (2010) examined the 
relationship between audit quality and financial structure. Obtaining data from 198 
firms, and using logistic regression analysis, the researcher found a positive and 
significant relationship between audit quality and the financial structure of a firm.  
Soliman and Elslam (2012) examined the impact of corporate governance on audit 
quality in Egypt and found that board independence, role duality and audit 
committees had a significant and positive relationship with audit quality. Woodland 
and Reynolds (2003) also examined the relationship between audit quality and 
financial performance. The authors used audit fees as proxy for audit quality. 
Woodland and Reynolds (2003) found a positive relationship between audit quality 
and financial performance. In addition, Smii (2016) examined the impact of audit 
quality on the accounting profit of firms listed on the Tunisia Stock Exchange (TSE). 
The study found a positive and significant impact of audit quality on the accounting 
profit of the firms. Hua, Hla and Isa (2016) also found that audit quality had a 
positive and significant impact on financial performance of firms in the Malaysian 
construction sector.  
In other study, Rahimi and Amini (2015) evaluated the relationship between audit 
quality and the profitability of companies listed on the Tehran Security Exchange. 
The authors used the size of the audit firm and number of years of auditing as 
measures of audit quality. The authors found that audit quality had a positive but 
insignificant relationship with the performance of the firms. In Malaysia, Sulong, 
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Gardner, Hussin and Sanusi (2013) also investigated the impact of managerial 
ownership, leverage and audit quality on the performance of firms, measured by both 
return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Using agency theory, the authors 
found that audit quality had a significant and negative impact on the performance of 
the firms. Similarly, Elewa and El-Haddad (2019) investigated the effects of audit 
quality, measured by the Big 4 benchmark and auditor rotation on the performance 
of firms. The findings revealed that audit quality had no impact on the performance 
of firms. Hsiao, Lin and Yang (2012) also found no relationship between audit 
quality and financial statement fraud.  
In addition, Salehi, Moradi and Paiydarmanesh (2017) examined the effects of 
corporate governance on audit quality disclosures. The study found no relationship 
between corporate governance and the quality of audit disclosures. It can be observed 
that the previous related studies concentrated on the relationship between audit 
quality and corporate governance. Few studies that investigated the impact of audit 
quality on firm performance used different variables such as audit committee, years 
of auditing and audit firm size as variables to measure audit quality. However, the 
studies on the moderating effects of corporate governance on the relationship 
between audit quality and firm value were absent. This study narrows this literature 
gap.  
 
3. Research Design 
The study included all the commercial banks in Ghana. During the period, there were 
thirty-six (36) commercial banks in Ghana. The study covered a period of eight 
years, from 2010 to 2017. All the data used for the study were sourced from the 
annual reports of the banks. Annual reports are the official documents firms and 
organisations use to communicvate with their stakeholders (Maama & Appiah, 
2019). A total of two hundred and eighty-eight (288) firm-year observations were 
expected. Due to the unavailability of data in respect of a number of banks, the study 
used two hundred and fourteen (214) firm-year observations. Specifically, corporate 
governance and audit quality information were obtained from the directors’ reports’ 
sections of the annual reports. In addition, the financial statements provided the data 
on the financial performance of the firms.  
To establish how audit quality affects the financial performance of the firms, a 
random effect estimation technique was used. The models used for the estimation 
are provided in equation 1 and 2.  
Tobin’s Qit = β0 + β1AuditQit + β2Sizeit + β3ROEit + β4Ageit + β5Levit + Ԑit (1) 
Tobin’s Qit = β0 + β1AuditQit + β2(AuditQit*CG) + β3Sizeit + β4ROEit + β5Ageit + 
β6Levit + Ԑit …         (2) 
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The variables in the model are explained below: 
Tibin’s Qit is the value of the firms at time t, measured by the market value of firms 
divided by the total assets; AuditQit is Audit Quality at time t, measured by the type 
of audit firm, one (1) representing Big 4 audit firms and zero (0) otherwise; size is 
the total assets of the firms at time t; ROEit is return on equity at time t; Ageit is the 
years of existence of the firms; Levit is the leverage of the firms at time t measured 
by the ratio of total debt to total equity and Ԑit as the random error term.  
The study used Tobin’s Q (dependent variable) as proxy for the value of the firms 
and auditor firm size (Big 4 vs. Non-Big 4) as proxy for audit quality (independent 
variable. As the purpose of external audit is to improve financial reporting quality 
and further provide valuable advice, the study examines whether there are significant 
differences in performance between clients of Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms. 
Further, the study investigates if corporate governance (proxied by the percentage of 
independent directors on the audit committee) occupies any moderating role in the 
relationship between audit quality and firm performance. Evidence suggested that 
the value of firms is influenced by other variables such as size, return on equity 
(ROE), age and leverage of firms and therefore these are introduced as control 
variables.  
 
4. Results and Discussion  
4.1. Descriptive Analysis  
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used for the study. The 
average value for the audit quality was 0. 737, meaning more than half of the firms 
were audited by the Big 4 auditing firms. In addition, the average size of the firms 
was 1. 284 billion cedis, with a maximum and minimum values of 9. 098. 14 billion 
and 312. 66 million cedis respectively. With a standard deviation of 983. 83 million 
cedis, it suggests that there is a wide difference among the firms with respect to their 
size. The average return on equity (ROE) of the firms was 2. 75% whilst the average 
leverage of the firms was 135. 72%. Similarly, the average corporate governance 
variable is 86. 13 percent, suggesting that more than 81% of the audit committee 
members of the banks were nonexecutive directors.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Data 
 Mean  Standard Deviation Maximum  Minimum  
Audit Quality 0. 737 0. 585 1 0 
Firm Size  12837. 94 983. 83 9098. 14 312. 66 
ROE 2. 75 3. 748 7. 84 -8. 77 
Age  22. 63 31. 74 99 7 
Leverage  135. 72 186. 85 368. 96 76. 52 
CG 86. 13 74. 61 100 50 
 
4.2. Multicollinearity Test 
To check for multicollinearity among the variables, correlation analysis was 
performed. As shown in Table 2, the correlation among the variables was not strong. 
Except for the correlation between audit quality and firm size (r = 0. 483) and firm 
size and age of the firms (r = 0. 517), the correlations coefficient among the variables 
were less than 0. 4. According to Hair et al. (2009), a multicollinearity exists if the 
correlation between two variables is above 0. 90. Based on the results, it can be stated 
that no serious correlation problem exists. Confirming this claim, the variance 
inflation factors show that there was no problem of multicollinearity among the 
variables.  
Table 2. Correlation Matrix and VIF Results 
 AuditQ Size ROE Age Leverage  CG VIF 
Audit 
Quality  
1. 00      1. 
193 
Firm 
Size 
0. 
493*** 
1. 00     1. 
118 
ROE 0. 153* 0. 
264* 
1. 00    1. 
003 
Age  0. 
364** 
0. 
517** 
0. 
074* 
1. 00   1. 
171 
Leverage  -0. 
247* 
-0. 
285 
-0. 
106* 
0. 246 1. 00  1. 
024 
CG 0. 363* 0. 
218* 
0. 
183 
0. 
163** 
0. 0764 1. 
00 
1. 
132 
*** = p < 0. 01; ** = P < 0. 05 and * = p < 0. 10 
4.3. Regression Results  
The results on the impact of audit quality on firm value are presented in Table 3. The 
first model shows the impact of audit quality on firm value. In addition, the results 
on how corporate governance moderates the relationship between audit quality and 
firm value is also presented with model 2 in Table 3. The Hausman Test results (p = 
0. 2717) presented in Table 3 suggests the results is insignificant and thus the null 
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hypothesis of the presence of time specific variations in the model is not rejected. As 
a result, a Random Effect model was used for the estimation. The results presented 
in Table 4 show that audit quality have a positive impact on the value of a firm. This 
means that the engagement of the services of the Big 4 audit firms contribute to the 
increment of the value of the firms. Here, the coefficient of . 0. 0943 suggests that 
the engagement of any of the Big 4 auditing firms can result in a 9. 43% percentage 
increase in the value of the firms, when the other variables remain unchanged.  
This result is plausible because the quality of an audit enhances the quality of 
financial reporting, reduction in agency costs that arise from the opportunistic 
behaviour of managers and reduction in information asymmetry. Similarly, the 
results reflect the reality because quality auditing provides assurance to the various 
stakeholders as well as offer valuable advice to businesses which eventually result 
in an improved performance. In addition, this result is consistent with the explanation 
that the monitoring roles occupied by external auditors can align the interest of both 
the owners and managers and eliminate conflicts of interest, which are inherent in 
corporate management. These monitoring roles occupied by the quality of audit 
ensures that financial statements provided by management are reliable and accurate. 
This result confirms the findings of earlier similar studies by Zureigat (2011); Chen, 
Chen, Lobo and Wang (2011); Hassan and Farouk (2014); Matoke and Omwenga 
(2016); and Smii (2016), who provided evidence that audit quality result in an 
increase in the value of a firm.  
The impact of firm size on the value of the firms is positive, suggesting that firms 
with larger assets has the higher propensity for increasing their value. Similarly, the 
return on equity (ROE) of the firms has a positive impact on the value of the firms. 
With a coefficient of 0. 1748 (significant at 10%), it suggested that a percentage 
increment in the ROE of the firms increases the value of the firms by 17. 48% when 
the other variables are held constant. The results further suggest that the age of the 
firms positively relate to the value of the firms. This is consistent with the idea that 
firms that has been in existence for a long time has the required experience and 
resources to create value. In addition, the leverage of the firms had a positive impact 
on the value of the banks.  
The Model 2 incorporates a moderating variable, corporate governance 
(AuditQ*CG), to examine whether the relationship between audit quality and firm 
value is conditional upon the strength of corporate governance (measured by the 
percentage of independent audit committee members). Here, it can be found that the 
previously insignificant relationship between audit quality and firm value no longer 
holds. With the existence of good corporate governance, the audit quality has a 
significant impact on the value of the firms. This implies that a strong corporate 
governance helps to better moderate the relationship between audit quality and the 
value of firms. This result is confirmed by the comparison of the R2 and the adjusted 
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R2 of the two models. The R2 and the adjusted R2 of model two are 67. 41% and 59. 
33% respectively whilst the R2 and the adjusted R2 of model one are 63. 15% and 57. 
38% respectively. This is consistent with the corporate variance variable contributing 
to the additional explanatory power of the model.    
The moderating role played by the corporate governance can be explained by the 
fact that the audit committee is made up mostly of non-executive directors and thus 
are able to work effectively to ensure audit quality and increased firm value. This is 
because the audit committee occupies corresponding roles between external auditors, 
management and the board of a firm and in this context serves as a trustee in the 
system of governance that assists to eliminate or, at least, decrease information 
asymmetry, thereby mitigating agency issues. By occupying this role, the 
independent audit committee contributes towards quality auditing. The result 
suggested that the separation of ownership from management highlights the 
necessity for a quality audit. In addition, the result can be explained by the fact that 
the audit committee is assigned the responsibility of ensuring effective internal 
control, which is necessary for the smooth running of a firm. This result is consistent 
with the findings of Sultana, Singh and Rahman (2019), who explained that to 
mitigate the risk of corporate financial failures and enhance the confidence of the 
public, effective functioning of an independent audit committee is needed. These 
results confirmed the findings of earlier studies such as Soliman and Elslam (2012); 
and Al-Dhamari and Chandren (2018) whose finding was that corporate governance 
is able to enhance the relationship between audit quality and firm value.  
Table 3. Regression Results 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Constant  18. 25 (3. 721) 19. 92 (3. 182) 
Audit Quality  0. 0943 (1. 827) 0. 1568** (1. 925) 
Firm Size 0. 1941** (2. 028) 0. 1746** (1. 936) 
ROE 0. 1749* (2. 127) 0. 1633* (2. 328) 
Age  0. 1174* (2. 853) 0. 1059* (1. 926) 
Leverage  0. 0857* (1. 629) 0. 0815* (1. 181) 
AuditQ*CG  0. 0822**(1. 697) 
R2 0. 6315 0. 6741 
Adjusted R2 0. 5738 0. 5933 
F-stats  58. 53*** 63. 72*** 
   
Hausman Test    
Chi-square 3. 646  
d. f.  2  
p-value 0. 2719  
*** = p < 0. 01; ** = P < 0. 05 and * = p < 0. 10 
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5. Conclusion  
The debate on the impact of audit quality on firm value and how corporate 
government moderates this relationship has surfaced as a result of numerous 
corporate scandals in Ghana. As a result, the study examined the impact of audit 
quality on firm value and how corporate government moderates this relationship. 
The results revealed that audit quality exercises a positive impact on the value of a 
firm. In this context, the engagement of the services of the Big 4 audit firms 
contribute to the increment of the value of the firms. In addition, the existence of 
good corporate governance improves the relationship between the audit quality and 
the value of the firms. Corporate governance better moderates the relationship 
between audit quality and the value of firms. The implications of this results are two-
fold. First, audit quality is significant towards the growth of a firm. In addition, firms 
must have strong corporate governance, especially the audit committee if they want 
to reap the full benefit of external auditors.  
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